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Chief, Operations School, OTR

14 May 1957

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War Report, Office of Strategic Services (TOP SECRET)

1. In accordance with your request, I have again reviewed the two-volume history of COI-OSS in an effort to list for Chief, FI/DDP, the more sensitive portions which he may wish to review prior to determining whether it should be released to the Department of the Army. Selection was especially difficult, because I do not understand what use the Army plans to make of the Report.

2. First, it should be pointed out that, so far as I have been able to learn, the Report has never been used by the Office of Training, either for instructional purposes or as a basis for training studies. References are made to OSS training sites and programs, both in the U.S. and abroad, as well as to the activities of all other OSS components, but the Report was necessarily restricted in length—some 1,000 pages, including appendices and glossary, covering a period of approximately four years. The two volumes, I believe, were buried in the R & S Vault until the U.S. Army Special Forces Unit, [REDACTED] requested one of the instructors to obtain them from Headquarters. One of the trainees was formerly with OSS and may have seen them or, more likely, knew of their existence. The request was refused.

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3. Throughout the volumes, footnotes refer to the "History Project Files" in OSS Archives for more detailed information on the subjects covered—policy, organization, operations, etc. No matter what purpose the Army has in mind in requesting the Report, the brevity with which most of the subjects are covered would almost inevitably result in the Army requesting access to these "written sources, reports and administrative records" so frequently cited.

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
4. Since the Report deals with all aspects of OSS organization and operations at the highest government policy level, its release outside CIA--even to another U.S. Government department--is a policy decision for determination at a high level in the Agency, possibly by the DDCI. Some of the materials probably have long since been declassified, but in some instances, such as in the case of personal correspondence between General Donovan and President Roosevelt, I am uninformed as to its present sensitivity. (I cite particularly Exhibit W-9, vol. 1, p. 271, which comments on a report from Under Secretary Berle to Mr. Sumner Welles, forwarded to General Donovan by the President.)

5. Considerable space is devoted also to the controversy between the U.S. Navy and OSS concerning the [REDACTED] covering Far Eastern activities. This account is completely objective--from OSS' point of view--but the Navy, especially its representatives [REDACTED] may have a different version. (I remember my amazement at meeting Admiral Miles and discovering he had no horns!)

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7. An objective reading of these volumes, plus personal experience in a single geographic area with OSS, has resulted in selection of items which still appear exceedingly touchy, despite the lapse of time and a post-war "forgive and forget" attitude of the individuals and services concerned. References probably also exist to other sensitive dealings and sore spots which I cannot recognize because of lack of familiarity with the operations, [REDACTED] Among possibly sensitive

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8. May I make one suggestion which you may wish to pass along to [REDACTED] Several members of the OSS History Project staff are now at Headquarters [REDACTED]

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